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Abstract
Safety and security are both qualities that concern the overall system. However, these disciplines are traditionally treated inde-
pendently in the automotive domain. Replacement of classical mechanical systems with safety-critical embedded systems raised
the awareness of the safety attribute and caused the introduction of the ISO 26262 standard. In contrast to this, security topics are
traditionally seen as attacks of a mechanical nature and as only aﬀecting single vehicles (e.g. door lock and immobilizer related).
Due to the increasing interlacing of automotive systems with networks (such as Car2X), new features like autonomous driving, and
online software updates, it is no longer acceptable to assume that car ﬂeets are immune to security risks and automated remote at-
tacks. Consequently, future automotive systems development requires appropriate systematic approaches to support cyber security
and safety aware development.
Therefore, this paper examines threat and risk assessment techniques that are available for the automotive domain and presents
an approach to classify cyber-security threats, which can be used to determine the appropriate number of countermeasures that need
to be considered. Furthermore, we present a combined approach for safety and security analysis to be applied in early development
phases, which is a pre-requisite for consistent engineering throughout the development lifecycle.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
In the late 1970s self-contained embedded systems called Electronic Control Units (ECUs) were introduced into
production vehicles. Since then, the complexity of embedded systems in the automotive industry has grown signiﬁ-
cantly. Embedded automotive systems are estimated account for 80 % of product innovations in the past decade and
are responsible for 25% of current vehicle costs25. Such computer systems have been integrated into almost every
aspect of a car and control throttle, transmission, brakes, passenger climate and infotainment.
Additionally, today’s information society strongly supports inter-system communication (Car2X) in the automotive
domain. Consequently the boundaries of application domains are disappearing even faster, which causes multiple
cross-domain collaborations and interactions. This higher degree of integration and the safety- and security-criticality
of the control application raises new challenges. These challenges have a major impact on product development and
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product release as well as the brand reputation of a company. Consequently, future automotive systems development
requires appropriate systematic approaches to support cyber security and safety aware development.
Therefore, safety standards such as ISO 2626212 for road vehicles have been established to provide guidance during
the development of safety-critical systems. In contrast to this, security topics are traditionally seen as physical attacks
that only aﬀect single vehicles (e.g. door lock and immobilizer related). Due to new functionalities like autonomous
driving, and online software updates, it is no longer acceptable to assume that car ﬂeets are immune to security risks
and automated remote attacks. Consequently, future automotive systems development requires appropriate systematic
approaches to support cyber security and safety aware development.
To that aim, this paper examines threat and risk assessment techniques available for the automotive domain and
presents an approach to classify cyber-security threats, which can be used to determine the appropriate number of
countermeasures that need to be considered. Furthermore, we present a combined approach for safety and security
analysis to be applied in early development phases, which is a pre-requisite for consistent engineering along the devel-
opment lifecycle. Indeed, a common analysis method delivering consistent dependability targets across the diﬀerent
attributes is the basis of performing consistent dependability engineering during the entire product development.
This document is organized as follows: Section 2 assesses related works dealing with (automotive) safety and secu-
rity related topics. Section 3 provides a description of the applied method and the contribution to an early development
phase safety-hazards and security-threat analysis. An application of the approach for an automotive battery manage-
ment system (BMS) use-case scenario is presented in Section 4. Concluding remarks can be found in Section 5.
2. Related Work
Safety and security engineering are very closely related disciplines and could greatly beneﬁt from one another if
adequate interactions are deﬁned. Both disciplines focus on system-wide features and should be integrated into the
development process from the initial phases and onwards. Safety engineering is already an integral part of automotive
engineering and safety standards are well established in the automotive industry. Safety assessment techniques, such as
failure mode and eﬀects analysis (FMEA)9 and fault tree analysis (FTA)10, among others, are speciﬁed, standardized,
and integrated in the automotive development process landscape. Nevertheless, security engineering practices and
methods are not yet that settled in the automotive domain.
The road vehicles functional safety norm ISO 2626212 and its basic norm IEC 615088 both provide a ﬁrst approach
to integrating security requirements in their novel draft editions. IEC 61508 Ed 2.0 states that security threats should
be considered during hazard analysis in the form of a security threat analysis. However, this threat analysis is not
speciﬁed in more details in the standard and IEC 61508 Ed 3.0 is due to be elaborated regarding security-aware safety
topics. Also ISO 26262 Ed 2.0, which is currently in progress, is likely to include recommendations for ﬁtting security
standards and appropriate security measure implementations. Nevertheless, neither the recently presented SAE cyber-
security guidebook SAE J306130, nor the ISO 26262 draft specify the threat analysis methods to be applied in more
detail.
In aeronautics domain ARP475422 provides guidance for system level development and deﬁnes steps for the ad-
equate reﬁnement and implementation of requirements. Security concerns in the aeronautics industry are tackled by
the Common Criteria29,13 speciﬁcation.
Other standards, such as IEC 6244311, or guidelines, such as SAE J306130, are not applicable in practice for the
automotive domain in their current state. An analysis done by SoQrates Security AK2 indicates that the available
standards are frequently fragmented or incomplete, and typically assume that their open issues are covered by other
guidelines or standards. For this reason, several other researchers and research projects have also recently made eﬀorts
and publications to combine security and safety engineering approaches.
As mentioned earlier in the document, security has long been a concern in the aeronautics domain. In the avionics
domain DO-178C27, which addresses aeronautics software safety, and ARP475422 provide guidance for system level
development and deﬁnes steps for the adequate reﬁnement and implementation of requirements. Safety assessment
techniques, such as failure mode and eﬀects analysis (FMEA) and functional hazard assessment (FHA), among others,
are speciﬁed by ARP476121 and security concerns in aeronautics industry are tackled, for example, by the Common
Criteria29,13 approach and the ED202 speciﬁcation5.
Paulitsch et. al18 outline issues in assessing the reliability of avionics software for safety and security perspectives.
The authors aim at ﬁnding indicators and collecting evidence of eﬀectiveness of existing safety-related and security-
related processes in terms of eﬀects on aircraft security.
An overall security threat analysis of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is done by Javaid et. al14. This work
calculates the likelihood, impact, and risk of a security threat. Nevertheless, an estimation of the likelihood of an
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attack can be inappropriate due to the fact that in some cases a threat’s likelihood of appearing must be assumed to be
100% for the design phase.
A threat analysis framework for critical infrastructures is proposed by Simion et. al26. This framework identiﬁes
and deﬁnes threat attributes and uses these attributes to characterize the threat potential. The authors consider the
required resources and attacker’s commitment in order to determine the threat attributes.
In other domains, such as personal computers and consumer electronics, security analysis is more common and
approaches and best practices are well known. Although, embedded automotive systems and the automotive domain
do have diﬀerent constraints to these domains and adaptations are required.
The STRIDE threat model approach17 developed by Microsoft Corporation can be used to expose security design
ﬂaws. This approach uses a technique called threat modeling which is based reviewing the system design in a me-
thodical way. Threat modeling is processed in ﬁve steps: (a) the identiﬁcation of security objectives, (b) a survey of
the application, (c) the decomposition of the application, (d) the identiﬁcation of threats, and (e) the identiﬁcation of
vulnerabilities. Threat models, like the STRIDE approach, may often not prove that a given design is secure, but they
help to learn from mistakes and avoid repeating them.
In the automotive domain project, SeSaMo1 (Security and Safety Modeling for Embedded Systems) the focus is
on synergies and trade-oﬀs between security and safety in concrete use-cases. The work of Gashi et al. 7 is part of this
project and focuses on redundancy and diversity, and their eﬀects on safety and security of embedded systems.
A security-informed risk assessment is mentioned in the work of Bloomﬁeld et. al4. The focus of this publication
is a ‘security-informed safety case’ and the impact of security on an existing safety case, but neither guidance for such
an assessment is provided nor an assessment approach is proposed. The authors mention the requirement of such an
assessment methodology and describe a risk assessment process brieﬂy, but neither provide guidance as to how such
an assessment is done, nor do they propose an approach to it.
Kath et. al15 state model-based approaches as a promising approach to guarantee safety and security feature im-
plementation. The authors present a model driven approach to security accreditation of service-oriented architectures
in their work.
Some recent publications in the automotive domain also focus on security in automotive systems. On the one hand,
the work of Schmidt et. al23 presents a security analysis approach to identify and prioritize security issues, but solely
provides an analysis approach for networked connectivity.
The work of Ward et. al31, on the other hand, also mentions a risk assessment method for security risk in the
automotive domain called threat analysis and risk assessment, based on HARA. This work identiﬁes potential security
attacks and the risk associated with these attacks. The work also describes how such a method has been developed
based on the state-of-the-art HARA method.
The works of Roth et. al20 and Steiner et. al28 also deal with safety and security analysis, but focus on state/event
fault trees for modeling of the system under development, while Schmittner et. al24 present a failure mode and failure
eﬀect model for safety and security cause-eﬀect analysis. This work also categorizes threats also with the help of the
STRIDE threat model with the focus of an IEC60812 conforming FMEA approach.
Raspotnig et. al19 also combine safety and security methods for combined safety and security assessments of air
traﬃc management systems. The approach of their publication relies on modeling misuse cases and misuse sequence
diagrams within a UML behavior diagram.
The SAHARA concept16 quantiﬁes the security impact on dependable safety-related automotive system devel-
opment at system level. This concept classiﬁes the security threats of an automotive system using the STRIDE
approach17 and a special quantiﬁcation scheme developed for automotive application. The basis for this security anal-
ysis is the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA)12 safety analysis, which identiﬁes and categorizes hazardous
events relating to components of the system under development (SuD). This approach combines hazard and threat
analysis within one approach to acknowledge threats that may contribute to the safety-concept or lead to violation of
safety goals. Moreover, it also allows the systematical identiﬁcation of non-safety related security threats (in contrast
to14,4,31) based on the STRIDE approach. In contrast to20,28,24, which require higher analysis eﬀorts and more details
of the SuD, the characterization of the attack probabilities with the SAHARA approach is less complex and more
applicable for earlier development phases.
3. Safety-Aware Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (SAHARA) Approach
This section describes the SAHARA approach16, and characterizes the contribution of this paper, the enhance-
ments of the quantiﬁcation scheme for remote and ﬂeet cyber-security attacks, which will be applied in the next
section in more detail. The SAHARA method combines the automotive HARA12 with the security domain STRIDE
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Fig. 1. Conceptual overview of the SAHARA method16
approach17 to trace the impact of security issues on safety concepts at system level. STRIDE is an acronym for
Spooﬁng, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privileges; moreover
the STRIDE threat model can be seen as the security equivalent to HARA. The key concept of this threat modeling
approach is the analysis of each system component for susceptibility of threats and mitigation of all threats to each
component in order to argue that a system is secure.
Figure 1 shows the conceptual overview of the SAHARA method. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, an ISO 26262
conforming HARA analysis (right part of the overview ﬁgure) can be performed in a conventional manner. Besides
this, attack vectors of the system can be independently modeled using the STRIDE approach (left part of Fig. 1)
by specialists of the security domain. The two-stage SAHARA method then combines the outcome of this security
analysis with the outcomes of the safety analysis. The SAHARAmethod applies a key concept of the HARA approach,
the deﬁnition of automotive safety integrity level (ASILs), to the STRIDE analysis outcomes. Threats are quantiﬁed
similarly to ASIL quantiﬁcation, according to the resources (R) and know-how (K) required to exert the threat, and
the threat’s criticality (T). Security threats that might lead to a violation of safety goals (T = 3) can be handed over to
HARA for further safety analysis. This helps to improve completeness of safety analysis in terms of the ISO 26262
requirement of analysis of ’foreseeable misuse’, in this case hazardous events initiated due to security attacks.
Table 1 contains examples of resources, know-how, and threat levels for each quantiﬁcation level of K, R, and T
values. The three factors deﬁne a security level (SecL), as shown in Table 2 which is used to determine the appropriate
number of countermeasures needed to be considered.
Table 1. Classiﬁcation Examples of Knowledge ’K’, Resources
’R’, and Threat ’T’ Value of Security Threats
Level Knowledge
Example
Resources
Example
Threat
Criticality
Example
0 average driver,
unknown in-
ternals
no tools re-
quired
no impact
1 basic under-
standing of
internals
standard tools,
screwdriver
annoying,
partial reduced
service
2 internals dis-
close, focused
interests
non-standard
tools, sniﬀer,
oscilloscope
damage of
goods, invoice
manipulation,
privacy
3 advanced
tools, simula-
tor, ﬂasher
life-
threatening
possible
Table 2. SecL Determination Matrix - Determination of the secu-
rity level from R, K, and T values
Required
Resources ’R’
Required
Know-How ’K’
Threat Level ’T’
0 1 2 3
0 0 3 4 4
1 0 2 3 40
2 0 1 2 3
0 0 2 3 4
1 0 1 2 31
2 0 0 1 2
0 0 1 2 3
1 0 0 1 22
2 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 2
1 0 0 0 13
2 0 0 0 1
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This quantiﬁcation of required know-how and tools instead of any likelihood estimation (e.g. of the attack’s
success or fail, done by Javaid et al. 14) is beneﬁcial due to the fact that the classiﬁcation of these factors is better
aligned with the HARA classiﬁcation common in the automotive domain. Additionally, for the design phase the
likelihood estimation of an attack must be assumed to be 100% and it is more likely that required know-how and
resources required to exert a threat remain the same over the whole life-time of the SuD. The SAHARA method
further mentions, that after this quantiﬁcation of threats, adequate reduction or prevention by appropriate design
and countermeasures shall be performed. In the case of safety-related security threats, the threat can be analyzed and
resulting hazards evaluated according their controllability, exposure, and severity. This improves, as mentioned earlier
in this document, the completeness of the required situation analysis of the HARA approach by implying factors of
reasonably foreseeable misuse (security threats) in a more structured way. Moreover, a combined review of the safety
analysis by security and safety experts also helps to improve the completeness of security analysis. The combination
of the diﬀerent mindsets and engineering approaches of safety engineers and security engineers, which are able to
work independently from another and mutually beneﬁt from each other’s ﬁndings, are more likely to be result in
higher maturity of their analysis.
3.1. Enhancements of the Threat Quantiﬁcation Scheme
The previously mentioned SAHARA method is geared towards the needs of an analysis of security threats in
the automotive domain at an early development phase (concept level). Nevertheless, this analysis focuses on the
development of a single car, the identiﬁcation of security threats and safety risks at early development phases and
their mutual dependencies. For analysis of remote cyber-security attacks and attacks geared towards whole car ﬂeets
the SAHARA threat quantiﬁcation scheme is lacking in terms of measures for damage potential and aﬀected users.
Therefore, this work provides a novel approach to the quantiﬁcation of threats. The quantiﬁcation of threats
according to the risks they pose allows threats with the highest risk level to be resolved ﬁrst and therefore make
risk management more economical. The novel threat classiﬁcation approach we propose is an adapted DREAD
classiﬁcation scheme3, which can be promising for a more detailed analysis of the system design.
The DREAD acronym stands for:
• Damage Potential - determines the damage if vulnerability is exploited
• Reproducibility - identiﬁes the repeatability of the attack
• Exploitability - deﬁnes the applicability of the attack for repetition
• Aﬀected Users - represents an estimation of how many users might be aﬀected
• Discoverability - determines how easy the vulnerability can be found in the ﬁeld
The proposed classiﬁcation should quantify each category with none (0), low (1), medium (2), or high (3) impact
factors. Adding up these factors results in a risk priority number (RPN) for each of the threats, as known by the
failure mode and eﬀects analysis (FMEA)9 in the safety domain. This scheme better determines the damage potential
diﬀerences of threats and also represents an impact on the number of users aﬀected.
4. Application of the Approach
This section describes the application of the SAHARA approach for an automotive battery management system
(BMS) and evaluates the new threat quantiﬁcation scheme. The BMS use-case is an illustrative material, reduced
for training purposes; technology-speciﬁc details have been abstracted for commercial sensitivity and analysis results
presented are not intended to be exhaustive. The SAHARA analysis is done in a classical way, by determining the
SecL, and with the newly proposed DREAD approach to analyze the diﬀerence between these two rating systems.
The SAHARA method allows the description of the hazard and the worst situation in which this hazard may
occur in conventional ISO 26262 aligned manner. The ’hazardous situations’ are classiﬁed by an ASIL via severity,
exposure, and controllability and a high-level safety target (safety goal) and safety function (safe state) can be done
(established HARA analysis).
The security related analysis part of the SAHARA method is shown partially in Figure 2. The components of the
system and their possible attack vectors (taken from initial system design and the STRIDE approach respectively) are
used to generate a list of possible attacks. This list is detailed with a general situation description in which this attack
may be performed and the high level system service malfunction to which the attack will lead. The ﬁrst phase of
the SAHARA method is concluded by the classiﬁcation of the security risk by a SecL via resource, know-how, and
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Fig. 2. Screenshot of application of SAHARA method
Table 3. Classiﬁcation Extracts of SAHARA and DREAD Threat Rating Systems
Security Threat ’K’ ’R’ ’T’ ’SecL’ ’D’ ’R’ ’E’ ’A’ ’D’ ’RPN’
spooﬁng of HV system
ready signals
2 2 3 1 3 2 1 1 1 8
DoS communication with
charger
2 3 3 0 2 2 2 2 1 9
tampering of cycle status 2 2 2 0 2 2 3 1 2 10
threat level of the security attack. This SecL classiﬁcation provides means for assigning adequate eﬀorts to mitigate
the security risk and also states high-level security requirements to close these attack vectors. Figure 2 also highlights
level 3 threats. These security threats are handed over to the safety analysis for further analysis of their safety impact.
Table 3 shows the comparison of security threats analyzed in the classical SAHARA way and with the newly
proposed DREAD analysis. As can be seen by these extracts, the SecL of these threats is relatively low (1 or 0);
the resulting RPN are nearly equal but show the signiﬁcant diﬀerence that those threats which have a S ecL = 0
have a higher RPN than the threat with the S ecL = 1. This results on one hand due to the fact that the threat ’DoS
communication with charger’ is assumed to be done on the side of the external charger and therefore also has a
potential impact on more users. On the other hand, the exploitability of the threat ’spooﬁng of HV system ready
signals’ is, although having a high threat criticality, lower compared to the other example threats.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, safety and security are two challenging research domains for future automotive systems. Neverthe-
less, as stated by Firesmith6, safety and security engineering are very closely related disciplines and could mutually
beneﬁt from one another if their similarities are recognized and adequate interactions are established in a correct
manner.
This paper examines threat and risk assessment techniques available for the automotive domain and presents an
approach to classify cyber-security threats and safety risks. The safety-aware hazard analysis and risk assessment
(SAHARA) approach combines the automotive HARA (hazard analysis and risk assessment) with the security domain
STRIDE. This classiﬁcation can be used to determine the appropriate number of countermeasures that need to be
considered. The application of the SAHARA method has been demonstrated for an automotive battery management
system use-case. Additionally, an evaluation of the typical way of applying the SAHARA method, by determining
the SecL, and with the DREAD approach has been done to analyze the diﬀerence between these two classiﬁcation
schemes. This novel threat classiﬁcation scheme is more appropriate for the analysis of remote cyber-security attacks
and attacks aﬀecting whole car ﬂeets due to its incorporation of measures for damage potential and aﬀected users.
While the authors do not claim completeness or representativeness of the BMS use-case, the beneﬁts of the approach
are already evident.
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